I. Introduction
Health care providers receive lower reimbursements from Medicaid than any
other type of health insurance. In 2012, the average Medicaid reimbursement rate
was only 66 percent of the Medicare rate which is typically lower than the rate from
commercial insurance plans (Zuckerman and Goin 2012). The Medicaid rate must
be accepted as payment-in-full which means that providers receive no additional
coinsurance payments nor can they extract any additional fees from a Medicaid
patient even if the reimbursement rate is less than the total cost of care. As a result,
health services providers receive less compensation from a Medicaid patient relative
to a patient with any other form of health coverage and often argue that rates are not
even enough to cover costs. In order to subsidize the low rates from Medicaid
patients, some suggest that hospitals raise prices for privately insured patients to
subsidize Medicaid patients. Don George, the President and CEO of Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Vermont wrote that
“When government reimbursements are insufficient to cover the cost of the services a facility
provides to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries, hospitals charge patients with private
insurance enough to cover not only the cost of their services, but the shortfall created by
government reimbursements as well” (George 2014).
Charging higher private rates to make-up for public shortfalls is referred to as cost
shifting and has been believed by health care administrators to be a key strategy for
managing low public reimbursement rates.1 A study by the Milliman Institute
estimated that the cost-shift from public to private patients was a total of $88.8
billion or 15 percent of all medical costs in 2006/2007 (Fox and Pickering 2008). In

Dennis Vonderfecht, CEO of Mountain States Health Alliance stated that “Existing government
health care programs such as Medicaid fall short of covering actual health care costs -- meaning the
company depends on ‘cost-shifting’ to private insurance patients, who pick up more than the cost of
treatment.” (McCown 2009).
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this article I focus on dynamic cost-shifting – a phenomenon in which a negative
exogenous shock to revenue causes an increase in prices for privately insured
patients.
Economists have proposed several theoretical models of hospital pricing
behavior, but they produce conflicting predictions regarding the practice of dynamic
cost shifting. A key takeaway from these models is that cost shifting depends on
whether a hospital acts as a profit maximizer or as a utility maximizer and there is no
consensus on which behavior is most common to the hospital.2 Given the
inconclusive nature of the theoretical predictions, it is not surprising that the large
empirical literature that has sought to estimate the existence and extent of cost
shifting has produced a broad range of estimates.3
The goal of this paper is to measure the extent of cost-shifting when
hospitals are faced with an exogenous reduction in revenues. This is accomplished
by exploiting recent Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities that
reduced the average revenue per patient received by hospitals. Wagner (2015)
demonstrated that these Medicaid expansions led to 100 percent crowd-out of
private health coverage. Crowd-out occurs when newly eligible individuals with
private health insurance drop their current health plans in favor of public coverage
through Medicaid. Since crowd-out in the disabled Medicaid expansions was
complete, the take-up of Medicaid by newly eligible individuals was offset by an
equal reduction in private insurance coverage. This movement of patients from
private (generous reimbursement) to Medicaid (less generous reimbursement)
insurance generates lower revenues per admission and is simply a drop in revenue for
health care providers.

For example, see Sloan et al. (1973), Dranove (1988), Morrisey (1996), Showalter (1997), Clement
(1997), Zwanziger et al. (2000), Rosenman et al. (2000), and Friesner and Rosenman (2002).
3 See Clement (1997), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Cutler (1998), Dranove and White (1998),
Zwanziger et al. (2000), Friesner and Rosenman (2002), Dobson et al. (2006), Zwanziger and Bamezai
(2006), Wu (2010), Stensland et al. (2010), and Frakt (2011) for empirical estimates of cost-shifting.
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This paper is unique along a number of dimensions. First, the majority of
work on hospital cost shifting has used changes to the Medicare program as a source
of a shock to provider revenues. Medicaid, however, is a state run program and is
inherently different from the federally run Medicare program. Due to their
differences, health care providers may have greater incentive to cost-shift in response
to changes in the Medicaid program. Additionally, the cost-shifting discussion has
gained steam throughout the implementation of the policies stipulated under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Given that one of the largest
pieces of the PPACA is the expansion of the Medicaid programs in several states,
examining hospital responses to an increase in Medicaid beneficiaries is especially
relevant.
Second, most empirical approaches to identify cost shifting behavior have
relied on changes in the actual public reimbursement rate as the source of shock to
provider revenue but there are concerns that public reimbursement rates may be
strategically chosen by the government in response to private prices (Glazer and
McGuire 2002). Public and private patients share, to a certain degree, the privileges
and procedures offered by the hospital even though private patients pay more for
these services. If government payers are aware that hospitals will offer these shared
services so long as private patients will pay for them, they may adjust their rates to
optimize the benefit from the “commonality” of care public patients have with
private patients. Thus, empirical cost shifting estimates using changes in public
reimbursement rates for identification may be biased by reverse causality. The shock
to revenues used in this project more closely resembles the thought experiment
considered in theoretical work than previous empirical tests of the cost-shifting
hypothesis since identification is from an average change in revenue per patient
resulting from crowd-out in disabled Medicaid expansions. This exogenous event
likely bypasses concerns of reverse causality that are present when using changes in
Medicare list charges as I discuss further below.
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The first step in this project is to verify the existence of the one-for-one shift
in insurance types within the dataset. Wagner (2015) used data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the March Current Population Survey
(CPS) to demonstrate that Medicaid expansions for the disabled generate 100
percent crowd-out. In this paper, I use data from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample
(NIS) of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) from the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality and replicate the basic results of Wagner (2015)
with hospitalizations. Using Currie and Gruber’s (1996a and 1996b) measure for
simulated eligibility, I find that Medicaid coverage for inpatient stays increased by
roughly the same amount in magnitude as private coverage decreased. Taken
together, these results imply that crowd-out within the inpatient setting is complete
and there is a one-for-one relationship between Medicaid take-up and private
coverage reduction.
I find that in response to the shift in insurance types, hospitals reduced the
average charge rate for privately insured patients, while charge rates for other payer
types are not statistically significantly different as a result of the insurance shift. This
behavior is consistent with a Mixed Economy Model where the hospital acts as a
profit maximizer (Sloan et al. 1978). These results are important given that costshifting has been a major concern of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA). There has been much speculation that the PPACA Medicaid expansions
ongoing in several states will result in increases of private out-of-pocket medical
expenses and insurance premiums due to cost-shifting. The results of this paper
would suggest otherwise and that instead hospitals will actually reduce charges for
private insured patients.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our current state
of knowledge of cost-shifting. Section III outlines the research strategy. Section IV
details the data and estimating equations used for the study. Section V presents the
results of the paper. Section VI concludes.
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II. Conflicting Models and Inconclusiveness: The Ongoing Cost-Shifting Debate
Cost-shifting occurs when one consumer type is charged a higher price so
that another type can pay a lesser price relative to costs. Though this sounds very
similar to price discrimination, the ideas are really two entirely different notions.
Both price discriminators and cost shifters require that the supplying firm has some
market power, but under price discrimination, there does not need to be a direct
connection between the different prices the discriminator charges the different
groups. In contrast, with cost-shifting there is a causal and dynamic connection
between the different prices charged by cost shifters. Thus, while cost shifting
always involves some degree of price discrimination, it is not always the case that
price discrimination means cost shifting.
There are two main threads of literature that focus on modeling hospital
pricing behavior with regards to cost shifting. Both threads assume that the hospital
is faced with two types of insurance: a higher priced private market and a lower
priced public alternative. This two-market model has been commonly referred to as
a mixed economy model and was originally discussed in Sloan et al. (1978) as a way
of modeling physician participation in the Medicaid program. Using these models,
we form predictions as to how hospitals respond to a shock in provider revenue,
usually originating from a change to the public insurance reimbursement rate.
The first thread of the cost-shifting literature assumes that hospitals behave
as profit maximizers. In standard market models, if a hospital is profit maximizing,
cost-shifting strategies would not be employed. Profit maximizing firms should have
already exhausted their market power and further price discrimination is not
possible, eliminating the ability to cost shift onto private payers (Morrisey 1996). In
response to lower public payments, profit maximizing health care providers may
choose to accept fewer public paying patients (Showalter, 1997). This would be
challenging for hospitals since most are legally mandated to admit any patient who
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arrives requiring care. Hospitals would like to serve more private patients than
public patients, however, since they are reimbursed more per private patient. Thus,
in order to attract more private patients to use their facility, profit maximizing
hospitals will lower private prices (Showalter 1997). The new private price will still
be higher than the public reimbursement rate. This is the opposite of what costshifting theory would suggest.
A prediction from the profit maximization assuming models is that when the
public reimbursement rate is reduced, the private rate should also decrease. That is,
we would expect to see a positive correlation between Medicaid and private
reimbursement rates. Time series trends in private and public health prices run
counter to this prediction, however. Figure I plots the aggregate hospital paymentto-cost ratios for private, Medicare, and Medicaid insurance in the United States
from 1992 to 2012.4 As the private payment-to-cost ratio falls in the late 1990s, the
public payment-to-cost ratios rise and in the early 2000s when private rates rise again,
the public rates decline. The trends documented in Figure I demonstrate a negative
correlation between private and public hospital payments but this is at best only
suggestive evidence against the profit maximizing assumption.
The second thread of the cost shifting literature does not assume profit
maximizing behavior and instead focuses on hospitals behaving as utility maximizers.
A primary motive for this is that only 18 percent of US hospitals in 2011 were
investor-owned (for-profit) (American Hospital Association 2013). Not-for-profit
hospitals typically have no shareholders so any profits generated are used to fund
hospital operations or projects such as capital improvement or charity care. Many
not-for-profit hospitals have mission statements that indicate they seek to meet
community needs, provide care to as many patients as possible, and advance
treatment and means of prevention (Ginsburg 2003). As a result, it is often thought

The hospital payment-to-cost ratios are from the American Hospital Association’s Trendwatch
Charbook.
4
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that not-for-profit hospitals maximize a utility function with profit margin and
alternative objectives (usually identified within their mission statements) as
arguments.
One of the biggest challenges of the utility maximization approach is
determining which alternative objectives in addition to profits should be included
when modeling the hospital’s utility function. Frakt (2011) provides an excellent
review of the utility maximizing literature which I will briefly describe below. Several
studies assume that there are only two arguments in a hospital’s utility function:
profits and the total volume of medical services provided to the hospital’s
community (Dranove 1988; Clement 1997; and Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai
2000). These studies find that utility maximization models, unlike the profit
maximizing assuming models, allow for the possibility of cost shifting but do not
guarantee that cost-shifting will occur. Other studies assume that utility maximizing
hospitals care about their overall appearance to the community or their “prestige”
(Rosenman et al. 2000; and Friesner and Rosenman 2002). The Rosenman et al.
(2000) model shows that prestige maximizing hospitals can either cost shift or cost
cut in response to reductions in public payments.
The two threads of literature produce conflicting theoretical predictions. It is
clear that while profit maximization suggests the impossibility of cost shifting, utility
maximization implies that cost shifting may occur. Given these conflicting
theoretical results, there have been several empirical attempts to determine whether
cost shifting exists in the U.S. health care market. These studies focus not only on
whether hospitals cost shift, but also to what extent cost shifting occurs. Provided
that hospitals shift the burden of the reductions in public payments onto private
payers, they may do this dollar-for-dollar or at some lower rate. The majority of the
empirical literature finds that the extent of cost shifting is far less than dollar-for-
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dollar. 5 Only Cutler (1998) found evidence of dollar-for-dollar cost shifting and this
was restricted to the 1985-1990 time period.6
Though a large portion of cost shifting literature was published in the late
1990s to early 2000s, even more recent empirical cost-shifting articles still produce
conflicting results. Wu (2010) finds evidence of cost-shifting in Medicare payment
reductions stipulated by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, though the degree of costshifting is relatively small (only 21 cents per dollar reduction in Medicare revenue
was shifted onto private payers). White (2013) constructs private and Medicare
payment rates at a market level for the years 1995-2009. Using a “log-log”
specification, the results from White (2013) indicate that a 10 percent reduction in
the Medicare rate, led to a 7.73 percent reduction in the private rate. White’s results
suggest that hospitals did not pursue cost-shifting, but rather cost-cutting strategies
to make up for the deficit between private and public rates. Thus, even the most
recent empirical estimates still provide mixed results regarding the existence of cost
shifting in the US health care market.
One concern with current cost shifting estimates is that it is measured in
terms of direct changes to the actual public reimbursement rate (usually Medicare)
and it is possible that these rates are not chosen exogenously. Once admitted to a
hospital, patients share to a certain degree in services and amenities the hospital
offers no matter their insurance type. For example, most hospitals will not have two
separate MRI machines, one a top-of-the-line model for higher paying private
patients and the other an old out-of-date model for the government reimbursed
public patients. The hospital cafeteria will also not have two separate menus where
private patients are offered steak and lobster and the public patients are offered
Several empirical studies attempt to measure the extent of hospital cost shifting empirically. Studies
include Clement (1997), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Cutler (1998), Dranove and White (1998),
Zwanziger et al. (2000), Friesner and Rosenman (2002), Dobson et al. (2006), Zwanziger and
Bamezai (2006), Wu (2010), and Stensland et al. (2010). These are effectively summarized in Frakt
(2011), Table 2.
6 In the same study, he finds very little evidence of cost shifting from 1990 to 1995 speculating this as
being a result of increased managed care use during this time period.
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bologna sandwiches. Thus, when a hospital makes an investment into new
equipment or amenities, it is likely that both types of patients will benefit to some
degree and we refer to this phenomenon as the “commonality” of care amongst
patients.
If the degree of commonality is substantial between the two types, then
public patients benefit from the level of care for which private patients pay higher
prices. Payment rates set by hospitals for the private market reflect not only the cost
of the actual treatment for a patient, but also investments into new equipment or
training, maintenance and upkeep of facilities, and general amenities the hospital
chooses to offer. The government is aware of the fact that public patients benefit
from these investments even though the hospital is not reimbursed at the same rate
for providing them treatment. It is possible that the government can strategically set
the public reimbursement rate (with knowledge of the private rate) with the intent of
optimizing the degree of commonality between public and private patients (Glazer
and McGuire 2002). Thus, the private rates could actually influence the government
rate setting process which would result in reverse causality in the empirical equation.
It is therefore a concern that empirical estimates may be biased when a direct change
in public reimbursement rates is used for identification. In this paper, my research
strategy will not use a change in the reimbursement rate for identification and the
empirical estimates will avoid any reverse causality concerns originating from
strategic public price setting.
Another limitation of current cost shifting estimates is that most of them are
estimated relative to changes in the Medicare program. The Medicaid program, even
though it is slightly smaller than the Medicare program, is another important public
health insurance program in the United States. In 2012, Medicaid expenditures were
$421.2 billion which is 25 percent less than total Medicare spending ($572.5 billion)
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014). Though both programs provide
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health insurance to their recipients using government funds, Medicaid and Medicare
are incredibly different programs.
First, the two programs have different funding and administrative practices.
Medicare is entirely federally funded with all of its eligibility requirements,
reimbursement rates, and operating procedures completely determined by the federal
government. Medicaid, on the other hand is a state-run program that is duallyfunded by both the state and federal governments. States are allowed to choose their
own eligibility requirements, reimbursement rates/policies, and coverage options and
as long as these selections meet federal minimums, the federal government will
reimburse at least 50 percent of all Medicaid expenditures.7 Given that states are the
administrators of their own programs, Medicaid program characteristics can vary
quite a bit across states whereas Medicare is virtually the same throughout the entire
country.
Second, the beneficiaries covered by Medicare and Medicaid are not the
same. Medicare covers mostly elderly individuals (65 or older) and those who are
receiving Social Security Disability Insurance. Medicaid covers a wide variety of
populations (women, children, elderly, and disabled) with the foremost eligibility
requirement being that a recipient must have low income and limited financial
resources. The Medicare program has no income restriction to qualify and most of
its beneficiaries are actually required to pay some type of coinsurance fees.8 The bulk
of Medicaid policies require no type of copayment for treatment. Given the diversity
in their beneficiaries, it is possible that hospitals and health care providers may
respond differently to changes in the two programs and so it is important to

The federal reimbursement rate of Medicaid expenses in each state is called the Federal Medical
Assistance Percentage (FMAP). States receive an FMAP of at least 50 percent but no more than
74.73 percent. States with lower incomes per capita relative to the US income per capita receive higher
reimbursement rates from the federal government (Baumrucker 2010).
8 Coinsurance fees for individuals who are dually eligible for both the Medicaid and Medicare
programs are paid for by their Medicaid program.
7
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investigate cost shifting from a Medicaid perspective which is what is pursued in this
paper.
Since my estimates for cost-shifting are measured relative to Medicaid crowdout (described in the research strategy section below) rather than Medicare rates, it is
difficult to make a direct comparison to the results from Wu (2010) and White
(2013) in terms of the magnitude of the effect. I find, however, that in response to
the revenue shock, private rates are reduced which more closely aligns with the
results of White (2013).
III. Research Strategy
To improve upon earlier work, I employ an alternative method of identifying
cost shifting that avoids using a change in the reimbursement rate and also measures
cost-shifting from a Medicaid perspective. I take advantage of a unique Medicaid
expansion described in Wagner (2015). The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986
(OBRA86) gave states the authority to increase Medicaid income eligibility for
disabled individuals up to 100 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). Prior to
this authorization, the majority of disabled individuals had to qualify for Medicaid
through the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) which had an eligibility
cutoff of approximately 74 percent of the FPL. By 2003, 21 states and the District
of Columbia had enacted the OBRA86 expansion (Herz et al. 2006).
A major concern with any public health insurance program expansion is the
potential for crowd-out – when individuals with private insurance gain Medicaid
eligibility and drop their private coverage in favor of public benefits. The rate of
crowd-out has been a key focus of the public health insurance expansion literature
and crowd-out for children and families has been estimated to be close to 50
percent.9 Wagner (2015) investigated the degree of crowd-out in the disabled
See Aizer and Grogger (2003), Blumberg et al. (2000), Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), Cutler and
Gruber (1996), Dubay and Kenney (1996) and (1997), Gruber and Simon (2008), Ham and ShoreSheppard (2005), Hamersma and Kim (2013), Hudson et al. (2005), LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004),
9
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Medicaid expansions authorized under the OBRA86. Using both the March Current
Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the study
finds that crowd-out for the disabled population was large. The 2SLS estimates
imply that for every individual who took up Medicaid through the eligibility
expansions another lost their private insurance.10
Since crowd-out in these expansions was complete, disabled individuals
shifted from private health insurance (generous reimbursement) to Medicaid
coverage (less generous reimbursement) with little change to the overall insurance
rate. Given this shift, the overall patient pool had less revenue generating capability
after the expansions, reducing revenue to hospitals without any direct change to the
Medicaid reimbursement rate itself. Thus, the degree of crowd-out resulting from
changes to Medicaid eligibility can be used to identify any changes in hospital pricing
behavior resulting from the reduction to revenue. A benefit to this strategy is that
we avoid the potential for reverse causality that originates from strategic pricing to
optimize patient commonality of care.
Figure II presents a graphical representation of predictions of the effect of
crowd-out on medical prices from the mixed economy model. In the price setting
market (private health insurance), health care providers face a downward sloping
demand curve Demand 1 that corresponds to marginal revenue curve MRP1 and
have a marginal cost curve MC. Since the government has complete control over the
prices paid to providers for treating public patients, the government reimbursed
market is represented by the horizontal line at a fixed reimbursement rate, Pm. Prior
to the public insurance expansion, health care providers face the marginal revenue
curve ACD and will offer Q amount of medical services at a price of P1. When
Shore-Sheppard (2008), Thorpe and Florence (1998), and Yazici and Kaestner (2000). See Hamersma
and Kim (2013) and Gruber and Simon (2008) for a review of this literature.
10 These results are thought to indicate a switch from private to public coverage by the individuals
who take-up Medicaid coverage. Since the analysis uses cross sectional data from the March CPS and
the SIPP this cannot be stated conclusively given that the cross sectional data surveys different
individuals over time. The results do indicate a compositional change of insurance coverage type for
individuals who become eligible for Medicaid coverage through the expansion.
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Medicaid eligibility is expanded and crowd-out occurs, patients will shift from
insurance carriers in the private market to Medicaid coverage in the government
reimbursed market. Since the expansions only affect the eligibility standards, the
public reimbursement rate, Pm, is not altered and the government market demand
curve is unaffected by the legislation. In the private market, the shift in insurance
type means that MRP1 will rotate to MRP2 (Demand 1 rotates to Demand 2) since
the number of privately covered patients is reduced (Garthwaite 2012). A key
advantage of the Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities is that crowdout was essentially complete. This means that there will be no countervailing effects
on hospital revenue resulting from the uninsured gaining access to health coverage
through Medicaid. 11 After the expansion, the hospital now faces a marginal revenue
curve ABCD and the price for the provider with supply curve MC will decrease from
P1 to P2. Thus, the model predicts that the opposite of cost shifting will occur. That
is, hospitals will actually lower their prices for privately covered patients.
There may be a concern that state governments can control the level of
crowd-out in a public insurance expansion in such a way as to optimize the
commonality of care between public and private patients. If governments have this
ability, then cost-shifting estimates using my research strategy are potentially subject
to the same biases as those that are measured relative to the public reimbursement
rate as was the case in earlier literature. There are several reasons why this is not an
issue. Unlike the Medicaid reimbursement rate, states cannot directly set the level of
crowd-out in a public insurance expansion. They can only control the eligibility
levels which indirectly influence the degree of crowd-out. It is hard to imagine that
states have great control over the degree of crowd-out purely through eligibility
levels. Even further, the OBRA86 expansions only allowed states to select eligibility
If the uninsurance rate were to decrease, then this would suggest that some previously uninsured
individuals gained insurance coverage. This could result in a positive shock to provider revenue, since
prior to the expansion hospitals received zero reimbursement from these patients and are now
receiving at least the Medicaid level of reimbursement. Since the uninsurance rate remains unchanged,
there is no counterveiling effect on provider revenue and only a revenue reduction.
11
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levels below 100 percent of the FPL so they did not have free reign over their
eligibility standards.
Another reason I suspect that the strategic selection of crowd-out is not an
issue in this case is the large magnitude of the crowd-out rate. Crowd-out is a
contentious issue in public health insurance expansions drawing much debate and
criticism. As a result, governments would ideally desire for the level of crowd-out to
be as close to zero as possible and we would expect any type of state selection to bias
the rate of crowd-out down. Given that the rate of crowd-out for the Medicaid
disability expansion was 100 percent (essentially the highest possible level), this
suggests that states were not strategically capable of selecting the degree of crowdout within these expansions.
IV. Data and Estimating Equations
A. Data
The main data source for this project is the Nationwide Inpatient Sample
(NIS) which is part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) produced
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The HCUP NIS contains
information on discharges from nearly 8 million hospital stays each year in the
United States that includes patient demographics, hospital identifiers, duration of
hospital stay, diagnosis codes, total charges, and expected payment source (i.e.
insurance type). Weighted, the HCUP NIS represents nearly 35 million hospital
stays each year (HCUP databases 2009). Though the HCUP NIS contains a varying
number of participating states over time, with proper weighting the sample of
discharges in the dataset is stratified in such a way to be a national representation of
all inpatient discharges in the United States. My analysis will use data from the 19952007 HCUP NIS.12
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The 100% NIS sample is used for the analysis though smaller subsets of the data are available.
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I impose a number of restrictions to construct my study sample. The
Medicaid expansions being examined in this paper only apply to individuals with
disabilities. Thus, the main sample only considers discharges where the patient had a
disability. For the purposes of this paper, I define disability to be the presence of a
chronic condition on a patient’s discharge record since chronic disease is the leading
cause of disability. I describe in a later section how I determine within the NIS if
patient has a chronic condition. Given that most individuals 65 years and over are
automatically covered by Medicare, I restrict the sample to individuals under 65 years
old. I also eliminate women and children (individuals under the age of 20) from the
sample since Medicaid offers more generous coverage opportunities for these two
groups. A person’s race is strongly related to their participation in the Medicaid
program and I exclude 10 states not reporting this information. One additional state
(Wisconsin) was also excluded due to inconsistent charge reporting noted by HCUP
in their data documentation. The final sample contains 30 of 41 possible states. To
reduce the computational dimension of the problem some, only the top 100 primary
diagnosis codes are used in the main analysis. These diagnosis codes account for 57
percent of all disabled male discharges and 52 percent of all disabled male medical
charges in the HCUP NIS.
A unique quality of the HCUP NIS is that it contains data for multiple
insurance types: Private, Medicaid, Medicare, Self-pay, Charity-care, and Other. The
insurance type of “other” contains a wide variety of insurance policies including
military/veteran’s insurance, workman’s compensation, and state-specific insurance
pools. Since the insurance policies contained in this group are so broad, I exclude
individuals with “other” insurance type from the main sample.13
Summary statistics for the final sample are presented in Table I. The final
sample contains almost 4.9 million male discharges. Males with private insurance

Only 6% of disabled working age male discharges in the HCUP NIS were reported as having
“other” type of health insurance.
13
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account for 49 percent of the sample while Medicaid and Medicare each account for
19 and 21 percent, respectively. The remaining discharges are either covered by selfpay (uninsured) or charity-care from the hospital. The average charges per discharge
were $26,279 in real 2007 dollars with an average duration of hospital stay equal to
5.2 days. The sample was approximately 70 percent white, 19 percent black, and 9
percent Hispanic.
B. Identifying Disability
The HCUP NIS does not directly report whether a patient has a disability
and since the Medicaid expansions being used for identification are only for those
with disabilities, it is important to utilize an appropriate method of identifying
disabled individuals within the HCUP NIS. The definition of disability used for
Medicaid eligibility determination is the same as the definition used by the Social
Security Administration (SSA) for SSI qualification. SSA guidelines dictate that an
adult is considered disabled if she has a “medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” that prevents “substantial gainful activity” and is expected to “result in
death” or has “lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months” (Social Security Administration 2012). This definition is very broad
and relies heavily on a physician’s judgment.
In this paper, I will use the presence of a chronic condition as a proxy for
disability. Though they are not perfectly correlated with the SSA’s disability
definition, chronic conditions are the leading cause of disability in the United States
and are likely strongly related (CDC, 2014). The most common causes of disability
over the study period were all prominent chronic conditions (Hootman et al. 2005).
Using the diagnosis code information from each discharge contained within the NIS,
I can identify whether an individual has some form of chronic disease. To do this I
use the Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACG) System which will take the
diagnosis codes from the discharge record, determine which of these codes are
considered to be chronic conditions, and then form a count of total chronic
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conditions on a patient’s record. I then consider a patient to be disabled if they have
one or more chronic conditions reported on their diagnosis record. The top five
primary diagnosis codes for men with at least one chronic condition on their record
are reported in Table II. Most of these conditions are related to heart or lung
problems which were the most commonly reported forms of disability in the 2005
Survey of Income and Program Participation.
C. Measuring Crowd-out
In order to evaluate the expansion’s effect on the cost shifting behavior of
hospitals, we need to construct a measure of the shift in insurance type that results
from crowd-out. In the public insurance expansion literature that attempts to
measure crowd-out, authors use data at the individual level to construct dependent
variables that are dummy variables measuring insurance status such as having
Medicaid or private insurance. These insurance status variables are then regressed on
a dummy variable that measures whether the respondent is eligible for the Medicaid
program. Eligibility status in these studies is imputed using reported financial and
family information and as such likely contains measurement error. The regression is
also subject to an omitted variables bias in that there is a mechanical reverse
correlation between dependent and independent variables since disabilities reduce
earnings and lower earnings people are more likely to qualify for Medicaid. To
correct for both of these issues, the model is estimated with 2SLS using a suitable
instrument for Medicaid eligibility.
Wagner (2015) uses the simulated eligibility instrument originally outlined in
Currie and Gruber (1996a and 1996b) to investigate the crowd-out rate in the
Medicaid expansions for individuals with disabilities. Simulated eligibility uses a
fixed national population and compares that population to a state’s annual Medicaid
eligibility rules. The share of the fixed sample that qualifies for Medicaid under a
state’s rules represents the simulated instrument. Thus states with more generous
Medicaid programs will have higher simulated eligibility. Wagner (2015) uses this
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simulated measure to instrument for imputed eligibility and finds that for every 100
people made eligible through the expansion, nearly 41 took up Medicaid coverage
while 44 lost private coverage. Taken together, these results suggest that individuals
shifted onto public coverage from private coverage at an approximately one-for-one
rate.
The data necessary to construct simulated eligibility is the Medicaid
qualification rules for the disabled from 1995 to 2007 by state. Disabled individuals
have multiple routes they can pursue in order to gain Medicaid coverage such as
poverty related coverage through the OBRA86, the Supplemental Security Income
Program, or the State Supplemental Payment Program. During the study period,
poverty related coverage is experiencing the most changes and most of the variation
is derived from this pathway. Taking into account the eligibility rules of all these
different avenues, I construct an upper income limit – the maximum amount of
income an individual with a disability is allowed to possess and still qualify for
Medicaid coverage under one of the programs.14 Table III contains the upper
income limits for states in the sample in their first year of reporting to the HCUP
NIS and the last year of the sample period (2007). These upper income limits
demonstrate that there is quite a bit of variation in Medicaid eligibility rules across
states and time.
Following the strategy employed in Wagner (2015), I use the March Current
Population Surveys from 1996 to 2008 and restrict the sample to men between the
ages of 20 and 64 who report having a work limiting disability.15 Using this sample,

These rules were compiled from published sources following strategies described in Brown et al.
(2007) and Coe (2005). The specific sources used to construct the upper income threshold of
Medicaid eligibility rules for the aged and disabled were Brown et al. (2007) , Bruen, Wiener, and
Thomas (2003), Bruen, Wiener, Kim, and Miazad (1999), Coe (2005) , Congressional Research Service
(1993), De Nardi et al. (2011), Horvath (1997), Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
(2010), Kassner (2000), Mississippi Division of Medicaid (1991-2008), Social Security Administration
(1991-2008), Stone (2002, 2011), and state Medicaid websites.
15 Wagner (2015)’s primary analysis relied on data from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) which is a monthly level household survey, but found similar results using the
14
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the simulated eligibility measure is constructed as the percentage of disabled men
that would be eligible for Medicaid coverage under each state’s eligibility rules by
year. These percentages are then matched by state and year to the HCUP NIS. The
simulated instrument is a measure of Medicaid generosity by state and year that
reflects variation in the legislative changes in eligibility rules and not changes in the
characteristics of a state’s population. Simulated eligibility acts as a measure of how
likely crowd-out is to occur and we can use simulated eligibility as a measurement of
a shock to provider revenue. The simulated eligibility levels for a state in their first
and last year of the sample are displayed in Table III along with the corresponding
upper income limits that generated them.
The variation in the instrument is generated by changes in state legislation
concerning Medicaid eligibility rather than individual characteristics of a state and its
residents. For this measure to provide consistent estimates it must be the case that
the changes in the legislation are exogenous. This observation is consistent with the
assumption that states experiencing increased eligibility in their Medicaid rules did
not have different trends in coverage rates compared to states with static eligibility
rules over the same period. Using disabled working age individuals from the March
CPS 1992 to 2008, I test whether there is a difference in pre-treatment trends in
insurance coverage between reform and non-reform states.16 The key outcomes are a
set of measures of coverage rates at the state-year level of the four forms of
insurance listed in Table IV. I then regress these coverage rates on state and year
effects plus two variables that measure the pre- and post-adoption trends for the
states. The pre-adoption trend is constructed as a negative integer that indicates the
number of years until an expanding state’s adoption and zero for non-adopting states
or for years after a state adopted. The post-adoption trend variable is constructed as

March CPS. Given that the NIS is an annual survey, this paper uses the March CPS to construct
simulated eligibility in order to better align with the timeline of the NIS.
16 The sample contains observations from all states and not just HCUP participating states to fully
document no difference in the pre-trends for all reforming and non-reforming states.
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a positive integer that indicates the number of years after an expanding state’s
adoption and zero for non-adopting states or for years prior to a state’s adoption.17
The regression results for the pre-treatment analysis are presented in Table
IV. I find no statistically significant difference in coverage rates between adopting
and non-adopting states leading up to the expansions. The pre-adoption trend
coefficients in Table IV are near zero and statistically insignificant for all four types
of insurance coverage implying little coverage differences between adopting and
non-adopting states. There is a statistically significant difference between Medicaid
and private insurance rates post-adoption, however, and the coefficients on the postadoption trend variable indicate the presence of crowd-out. States who adopted the
expansions saw increases in their Medicaid rates and decreases in their private
insurance rates relative to non-adopting states though the magnitudes of the
coefficients are not exactly equal. Overall, the results in Table IV indicate the
similarity of coverage rates trends prior to expansion and supports the validity of the
instrument, but this is by no means a sufficient condition for no endogeneity.
D. Charges versus Prices/Payments
The HCUP NIS contains the total charges for each discharge which is not
necessarily equal to the actual payments the hospital received for the services it
provided. The terms prices and charges are often used interchangeably, but in
general refer to two distinct variables. Charges are usually understood to be the list
price of a service provided at the hospital while prices usually refer to the actual
payment that hospitals/providers received from the insurer (after rates have been
negotiated). It is widely believed that charges are irrelevant, marked-up versions of
prices and are not informative of current hospital cost conditions or behavior.
Several studies, however, have indicated that charges may not be completely
irrelevant particularly in regards to the setting of Medicare reimbursement rates, price

I group all observations with a pre-trend value less than or equal to -9 into one category. I also
group all observations with a post-trend value greater than or equal to 9 into one category.
17
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transparency, uninsured/out-of-network patients, and inpatient outlier provision
patients (Cookson, 2003, Dobson et al., 2005, Christensen et al., 2013.).
Actual payments and prices would be preferred over charges when
investigating effects on cost-shifting. Data sets containing actual payments from all
insurance types, over long periods of time, for multiple states, and at the patient
level, however, are rare and expensive. The question remains then as to how
informative total charges are in regards to payments? To evaluate this issue, I
obtained the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters (CCE) database from
Truven Health Analytics, Inc. for the years 2003 and 2004. The CCE contains
claims (actual payments) data from a selection of large employer-provided plans in
the United States for various encounter environments (Inpatient, Outpatient,
Pharmaceuticals, etc.). Using the inpatient encounters data, we can compare charges
in the HCUP NIS and the claims in the CCE and examine how informative one is of
the other.
First, I have to create comparable samples between the CCE and the NIS.
In order to align the CCE with my study sample, I eliminate claims for patients who
are not between the ages of 20 to 64 or who are female. Since the CCE contains
commercial claims, I restrict the HCUP NIS to only include patients covered by
private insurance in the years 2003 and 2004. Given that there is no direct link
between the patients in the two datasets, I calculate the average total charges from
the NIS and average total payments from the CCE for each state-year-DRG cell and
then merge the two databases based on these three characteristics. Merging based on
state, year, and DRG ensures that we are making charge and payment comparisons
for patients with similar geographic, time, and medical conditions.
Figure III is a scatterplot of the matched charges and payments from the two
datasets along with a 45 degree line. As expected, the scatterplot demonstrates that
charges are larger than actual payments. In particular, the difference between the
two measures is larger for higher levels of charges. Though the relationship between
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charges and payments is not one-for-one, the scatterplot does suggest that there is a
fairly informative relationship between the two. This relationship can be further
evaluated using a regression analysis. Estimates of a regression of the average
payments on the average charges imply that for every dollar increase in average
charges, average payments increases by 0.61 and 0.67 with and without state and year
fixed effects, respectively. A disadvantage to this analysis is that the CCE only
includes individuals with employer-provided coverage from large firms while the
HCUP NIS includes a general census of inpatient discharges in the United States.
Thus, even though we match charges and payments based on three influential
characteristics, it is likely that the general population from the NIS contains
individuals who have less comprehensive private plans than those from the large
employer-provided population of the CCE.
E. Estimating Equations
Given that the HCUP NIS contains millions of discharges, my analysis will
collapse the HCUP NIS into cells based on hospital, time, insurance type, and
various discharge characteristics. Collapsing the data in this way will help to reduce
the computational strain of the regression when I control for various fixed effects
and calculate clustered standard errors. In order for the identification strategy I am
proposing to be valid, it must be the case that the first stage (a shift in insurance
types) occurred in the HCUP NIS data as a result of the Medicaid expansions for the
disabled. To verify that such a shift did occur, I use the collapsed data to estimate
the following equation:
𝑖
𝑖
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛿ℎ + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑑

(1)

where h, t, and d represent the hospital, time, and discharge characteristics,
respectively. The superscript, i, represents the insurance type of the cell. The
𝑖
dependent variable in this equation, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
, is an indicator variable
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that equals 1 if the insurance type of the cell is type i and 0 otherwise. Using the
constructed sample of discharges from the HCUP NIS, Equation (1) is estimated for
four types of insurance coverage: Private, Medicaid, Medicare, and
Uninsured/Charity.
Hospital, time, and discharge characteristic fixed effects are given by 𝛿ℎ , 𝜏𝑡 ,
and 𝛾𝑑 , respectively. Hospitals are identified using the hospital identification variable
provided within the HCUP NIS. Time fixed effects account for both the year and
the quarter of the discharge. Discharge characteristic fixed effects control for the
primary diagnosis, race, age, and duration of stay of the patient. The primary
diagnosis codes follow the International Classification of Diseases version 9 Clinical
Modification (ICD-9-CM). Race includes indicators for whether a patient is white,
black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, or other. Age is broken
down into five categories: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64 years old. Duration
of hospital stay is divided into 7 groups: 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, and
30+ days. The key variable of interest in Equation (1), 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 , is simulated
disabled Medicaid eligibility for hospital, h, in time, t,. Since Medicaid expansions are
determined by the state, I cluster the standard errors at the state level to allow for
any arbitrary correlation.18,19 Regressions are weighted by the NIS discharge weight
that have been aggregated to the hospital-time-discharge characteristic-insurance cell
level.
Once the first stage is verified within the HCUP NIS, we can then proceed
to investigate the effect of Medicaid crowd-out on the charge rates by insurance type.
To do this I estimate Equation 2:

I have also run specifications where I cluster at the hospital level and the results are similar. The
structure of HCUP NIS is such that some hospitals are sampled for more than one year, but this is
not the case for all years and all hospitals. Since Medicaid eligibility is set at the state level, it is likely
that the appropriate correlation we need to account for is within the state.
19 I bootstrapped a few of my standard errors since I had only 30 clusters. Given that the
computational demand of the bootstrapping procedure is large, I only did this for a few regressions.
The statistical significance of the results did not change greatly.
18
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𝑖
𝑖
ln(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛿ℎ + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡𝑑

(2)

The indices, fixed effects, and 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 are defined the same as they were for
𝑖
Equation 1. The dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑑
, is constructed by dividing

the sum of the total charges by the total number of patients in each hospital-timedischarge characteristic-insurance cell. Equation 2 is then estimated separately for
each of the four types of insurance.
V. Results
A. First Stage: Shifts in Patient Insurance Mix
A crucial step in this study is to verify the results from Wagner (2015) by
showing that estimates from Equation (1) imply complete crowd-out of private
health coverage by the Medicaid expansions for the disabled. Estimates of Equation
(1) are presented in Table V. The estimate of the coefficient on simulated eligibility
in column 1 of Table V suggests that for a ten percentage point increase in simulated
eligibility, there was a 3.48 percentage point decrease in the number of private
discharges. This estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The effect
of simulated eligibility on Medicaid coverage (column 2 of Table V) is an increase of
2.98 percentage points for a ten percentage point increase in simulated eligibility and
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These estimates suggest a crowd-out
rate equal to 117 percent and is consistent with the results found in Wagner (2015)
which estimated the rate of crowd-out to be between 110-111 percent using data
from the SIPP.20 The shifting from private insurance to Medicaid coverage

The rate of crowd-out is constructed as the share of Medicaid take-up that is accounted for by
private coverage reduction.
20
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represents a total of $24,208,926 in lost charges from the study sample of working
aged disabled men.21
The estimated effects on Medicare and Uninsured/Charity coverage are
considerably smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant implying that there
was little change to the overall rate of insurance. The estimates in Table V confirm
the existence of a shift from private to Medicaid coverage that generates a revenue
loss to hospitals holding patient mix constant.
B. Effects on the Average Charge Rate
Given the verification of the first-stage, we can now use simulated eligibility
to estimate an effect of the revenue reduction resulting from the private to Medicaid
coverage shift on the average charge rate for patients in the HCUP NIS. Estimates
of Equation 2 are presented in Table VI for each type of insurance coverage. For
privately covered patients, a 1 percentage point increase in simulated Medicaid
eligibility resulted in a reduction of the average charge rate by 1.2 percent (column 1
of Table VI) which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Using the average
charges for private patients and the average change in simulated eligibility, this
estimate suggests an average decrease of $1,100 or 4 percent per private discharge.
The effect on the average charge rate for Medicaid patients (column 2 of
Table VI) was virtually zero, suggesting a statistically insignificant 0.08 percent
reduction in the charge rate for a 1 percentage point increase in simulated eligibility.
No change in the average Medicaid charge rate is expected since hospitals have no
price setting power in the Medicaid market where reimbursement is determined by
the state government. The estimated effects on the charge rates for the two
remaining insurance types are statistically insignificant though the estimates of their
coefficients are not as close to zero as the coefficient for Medicaid. These results are

On average simulated eligibility increases by 3.3 percentage points, suggesting a 1 percentage point
(9,233 individuals in the study sample) increase in Medicaid patients in the inpatient setting. The
average difference in charges between private patients and Medicaid patients is equal to $2,622
resulting in lost charges from crowd-out in the sample equal to 9,233*$2,622=24,208,926.
21
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consistent with the predictions of the mixed economy model from Figure II and at
the very least imply that hospitals do not employ cost-shifting strategies in response
to the disabled Medicaid expansions. Instead, hospitals reduce charges for private
patients while average charges for all other insurance types do not significantly
change.
C. Results for Men with No Chronic Conditions
The Medicaid expansions only increased eligibility for individuals who had a
disability. Since the HCUP NIS did not contain any direct data on whether a patient
was disabled or not, I defined disability to be represented by the presence of a
chronic condition on a patient’s diagnosis record. We may be concerned, however,
that this may not be an appropriate proxy for disability. One way to examine the
validity of this definition is by looking at individuals who have no chronic conditions
on their record. These individuals, by my definition, are not disabled and should
therefore not experience a change in insurance coverage. Table VII presents first
stage results for a sample of working age men who had no chronic diseases on their
discharge record. As expected, there is no statistically significant change in any type
of insurance coverage for this particular group and importantly the coefficient for
Medicaid coverage is near zero. Though not explored in this paper, it is possible that
there is a spillover effect on the average charge rate for non-chronic men. As a
response to the decline in payments from the disabled group, hospitals may have
tried to alter pricing strategies for the non-disabled group as well. This will be
explored in future work.
D. Average Charges Per Day Results
The charge rate for the analysis in Table VI is constructed as the average
total charges per discharge by insurance type. Though the results in Table VI
control for duration of stay fixed effects, we may also be interested in the effect on
average total charges per day spent in the hospital. Table VIII presents estimates of
Equation 2 where the dependent variable is the log of average charges per day spent
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in the hospital. Regressions in Table VIII do not control for duration of stay fixed
effects since this is accounted for in the denominator of the independent variable.
The effect on the charge rate per day for private patients in Table VIII, column 1
indicates a reduction of about 1 percent for a 1 percentage point increase in
simulated eligibility. This represents a decrease of about 79 dollars per day and is
statistically significant at the ten percent level. Given that the average hospital stay
was 5.2 days long, this translates into about $1,373 per privately insured patient
which is consistent with the estimated effect from Table VI. The effects on the
charge rates per day for the three remaining insurance types were all statistically
insignificant.

E. Varying the Number of Diagnoses in the Study Sample
The main analysis restricts the sample to the top 100 primary diagnoses
among working age men with at least one chronic condition. We may be concerned,
however, that this restriction is too selective and that the results presented in Table V
and Table VI will vary with the number of diagnoses included in the sample. Table
IX addresses these concerns. Panel A of Table IX presents estimates of Equation 1
and Equation 2 where the sample is restricted to the top 50 primary diagnoses
among men with at least one chronic condition. Panel B of Table IX repeats the
same analysis with the top 500 primary diagnoses.
The results in Panels A and B are virtually the same as in the main analysis
with the top 100 diagnoses. The rate of crowd-out is 112 percent for the top 50
diagnoses and 105 percent for the top 500 diagnoses. The reduction in the average
private charge rate is 1.3 percent and 1.1 percent per 1 percentage point increase in
simulated eligibility for the 50 and 500 diagnoses samples respectively. Using the
average change in simulated eligibility, this translates into reductions of $1,201 and
$1,033 for private insured patients from the top 50 and 500 diagnoses, respectively.
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These results are consistent with estimates from the top 100 diagnoses sample and
alleviates the concern that reduction in the private charge rate is limited to a specific
subsample of diagnoses among disabled men.
F. Duration of Stay
In response to the expansions, hospitals could alter the quantity of medical
services provided to a patient. One measure of quantity is the amount of medical
time given to a patient. There is some evidence that this may be affected following
Medicaid expansions. Garthwaite (2012) found that following the implementation of
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) expansions, pediatricians
spent on average less time per appointment with Medicaid/SCHIP patients. The
HCUP NIS does not provide information on how much time a patient spends with a
physician, but it does contain the number of days of the hospital stay.
Panel A of Table X presents regression estimates for the effect of simulated
Medicaid eligibility on average days spent in the hospital. The dependent variable in
the regressions is the total number of hospital days aggregated to the cell level and
then divided by the total number of patients for the cell. Only uninsured/charity care
patients experience statistically significant changes in the time spent in the hospital.
The estimates suggest that for a 1 percentage point increase simulated eligibility time
spent in the hospital decreased by 5, respectively for uninsured and charity care
patients. This result is very large suggesting nearly a 100 percent decrease.
Panel B of Table X performs a similar analysis as Panel A, but with the log of
the average number of hospital days. In Panel B, the effect on uninsured/charitycare patients is no longer statistically significant with a coefficient that suggests a still
large, but more reasonable 44 percent reduction in days spent in the hospital. The
results in Table X suggest that privately insured, Medicaid, and Medicare patients did
not experience a change in the amount of time they spent in the hospital suggesting a
similar quantity of care provided after the expansions across the insurance types.
The estimates are fairly noisy in both the level and log specifications, however, and
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make it difficult to state conclusively that there is zero impact on days spent in the
hospital.
VI. Conclusion
Cost-shifting has been a major topic of discussion within the United States
healthcare market ever since cost containment through reduced public
reimbursements was first proposed several years ago. Previous results (both
theoretical and empirical) on cost-shifting have been mixed, but hospital and
healthcare executives continue to claim that it is their main method of coping with
low reimbursement rates from Medicaid or Medicare. A report by Milliman in 2006
estimated that the aggregate amount of cost-shifting (the gap between total Medicaid
payments and private insurance payments) from Medicaid to Commercial patients
was $16.2 billion for hospital care alone (Fox and Pickering 2008).22
The development and implementation of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act has reawakened the cost-shifting debate. Given the large
Medicaid expansions that are already underway in some states, many private
consumers and insurance companies are speculating that increases in private out-ofpocket medical expenses and insurance premiums from cost-shifting are inevitable.
The Galen Institute argued that the expansion of Medicaid through the PPACA
would result in a “hidden tax” on millions privately insured patients and lead to a
vicious cycle in which more and more patients would drop private coverage because
of its growing premiums (Turner and Roy 2013).
The results of this paper would suggest the opposite, however. Hospitals do
not employ cost-shifting strategies in response to the Medicaid expansions for the
disabled. Instead, they actually reduce charges for private insured patients suggesting
that the privately insured actually benefitted from the expansions in terms of charges.
Milliman is an independent consulting specializing in actuarial products, but the cost-shifting study
cited here was requested by America’s Health Insurance Plans, the American Hospital Association,
the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, and Premera Blue Cross.
22
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Admittedly, the Medicaid expansions for the disabled were unique and the results
may not generalize to the broader populations affected by the PPACA Medicaid
expansions. At the very least, however, these results suggest that cost-shifting is not
the hospital’s only method of dealing with lower revenues as healthcare executives
often claim.
An important aspect not explored in this paper are the mechanisms by which
the cost reduction occurs. Do hospitals simply absorb these charge reductions and
accept lower profit margins or do they cut costs in other ways? One concern might
be that the overall quality of care is reduced. Preliminary results (not reported)
suggest that mortality rates for the privately insured and uninsured/charity-care
patients may be worsening, but further analysis is required. There are several other
quality measures of interest such as the likelihood of relapse/hospital re-admittance,
length of recovery time, level of investment in new technology/equipment, or
presence of post discharge complications (i.e. infections). Unfortunately, the HCUP
NIS does not have information on these quality measures so I leave this analysis for
future work.
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Table I: Summary Statistics for Working Age Men with At Least
One Chronic Condition in HCUP NIS Sample
Top 100 Primary Diagnosis Codes
Standard
Variable
Mean
Deviation
Average Age
% Black
% Hispanic
% Native American
% Pacific Islander or Asian
Average Real Charges
% Medicaid
% Medicare
% Private
% Uninsured/Charity
Average Length of Stay (Days)
Observations (Discharges)

49
0.19
0.09
0.004
0.01
$26,279
0.19
0.21
0.49
0.12
5.21

10.92
0.39
0.29
0.06
0.12
$42,209
0.39
0.41
0.50
0.32
7.53

4,859,310

Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using the discharge weight
constructed by the HCUP NIS. Charges are in 2007 real dollars

Table II: Top 5 Primary Diagnoses
Working Age Men with one Chronic Condition in the HCUP NIS 1995-2007
Diagnosis
Code
41401
4280
78659
486
41071

Description
Coronary Atherosclerosis (Native Vessel)
Congestive Heart Failure
Chest Pain
Pneumonia
Subendocardial Infarction

Number of
Discharges (% of
Sample Cases)
513,107 (10.56%)
223,573 (4.60%)
182,198 (3.75%)
178,737 (3.68%)
137,033 (2.82%)

Notes: Diagnosis codes follow the ICD-9-CM strategy.
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Table III: Medicaid Upper Income Threshold (UIT) and Simulated Eligibility
for States in HCUP NIS
First and Last Years in Sample
First Year
Last Year (2007)
First Year in
UIT
Simulated
UIT
Simulated
State
Sample
(% FPL)
Eligibility
(% FPL)
Eligibility
AR
2004
80
0.43
80
0.43
AZ
1995
74
0.40
100
0.50
CA
1995
99
0.48
102
0.51
CO
1995
83
0.41
77
0.41
CT
1995
121
0.55
94
0.48
FL
1995
90
0.44
88
0.46
HI
1997
115
0.53
115
0.55
IA
1995
74
0.37
74
0.40
IN
2003
74
0.41
74
0.40
KS
1995
74
0.37
74
0.40
MA
1995
133
0.60
133
0.60
MD
1995
74
0.37
74
0.40
MI
2003
100
0.50
100
0.50
MO
1995
71
0.36
85
0.45
NC
2000
74
0.37
100
0.50
NE
2005
100
0.50
100
0.50
NH
2003
78
0.42
77
0.41
NJ
1995
100
0.48
100
0.50
NY
1995
88
0.43
84
0.45
OK
2005
100
0.50
100
0.50
PA
1995
100
0.48
100
0.50
RI
2001
100
0.48
100
0.50
SC
1995
100
0.48
100
0.50
SD
2002
76
0.39
76
0.41
TN
1997
74
0.38
74
0.40
TX
2000
74
0.37
74
0.40
UT
2002
100
0.49
100
0.50
VA
1999
74
0.37
80
0.43
VT
2001
100
0.48
80
0.43
WY
2007
74
0.40
74
0.40
Notes: The Upper Income Threshold (UIT) is the maximum amount of income as a
percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) that an individual is allowed to have and still
qualify for Medicaid coverage. Simulated Eligibility is constructed as the share of a
national sample that would be eligible for Medicaid if a state’s eligibility standards were
imposed on the entire country. UIT and Simulated Eligibility are reported for the first
year a state enters the constructed sample and in 2007 (the last year of the study period).
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Table IV: Pre and Post Trends in State Insurance Coverage Rates
Work Disabled Sample 1992-2008 March CPS
Medicaid
Private
Medicare
Uninsurance
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Pre-Adoption Trend
Post-Adoption Trend
Mean(Ins. Rate)
Observations
R-squared

0.0005
(0.0020)
0.0048***
(0.0017)

0.0003
(0.0015)
-0.0035*
(0.0019)

-0.0004
(0.0011)
0.0006
(0.0010)

0.0008
(0.0013)
-0.0001
(0.0012)

0.31
867
0.7240

0.44
867
0.6766

0.27
867
0.6621

0.14
867
0.5885

Notes: Results are from the 1992-2008 March CPS for work disabled individuals between the ages
of 20 and 64. Regressions are OLS regressions of four types of state insurance coverage rates
(Medicaid, Private, Medicare, and Uninsured) on a pre-adoption trend and a post-adoption trend.
All regressions control for state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. * represents a 10% significance level, ** represents a 5% significance level, and *** represents
a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted using the SHADAC constructed weight for
CPS health insurance coverage.

Table V: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Insurance Type for Hospitals from
HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for Working Age Men with At
Least One Chronic Condition
Private
Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity
Covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Simulated Eligibility
-0.348***
0.298**
-0.016
0.066
(0.092)
(0.116)
(0.048)
(0.127)
Mean(Payer Type)
# of Cells
R-squared

0.49
3,672,037
0.2670

0.19
3,672,037
0.1981

0.21
3,672,037
0.1222

0.11
3,672,037
0.1314

Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age men with at least
one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS. The dependent variables are indicator variables for
four insurance types: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care. All
regressions control for Hospital, Year, Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration
of Stay Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight
constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents
a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a
1 percent significance level.
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Table VI: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Log Charge Rate by Insurance Type
for Hospitals from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for
Working Age Men with At Least One Chronic Condition
Private
Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity
Covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Simulated Eligibility
-1.214**
-0.076
-0.557
1.315
(0.554)
(0.711)
(0.439)
(1.836)
Mean(Payment Rate)
# of Cells
R-squared

$27,427
1,613,488
0.7563

$24,805
727,295
0.7786

$26,989
860,917
0.7435

$21,224
470,337
0.7526

Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age men with at least
one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS. Regressions are for four insurance types: Private
Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care. The payment rate is constructed
as the average charges per patient by insurance type. All regressions control for Hospital, Year,
Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay Category Fixed Effects.
Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and
standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, **
represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level. The
charge rate is constructed by dividing total aggregate charges by total discharges in a cell.

Table VII: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Insurance Type for Hospitals from
HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Working Age Men with No Chronic Diagnoses
Private
Medicaid
Medicare Uninsured/Charity
Covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Sim. Eligibility
-0.239
0.049
-0.001
0.191
(0.143)
(0.111)
(0.028)
(0.211)
Mean(Payer Type)
# of Cells
R-squared

0.63
1,514,597
0.2277

0.10
1,514,597
0.1446

0.04
1,514,597
0.0623

0.22
1,514,597
0.2067

Notes: Results are for working age men with no chronic condition in the HCUP NIS. The
dependent variables are indicator variables for four insurance types: Private Insurance,
Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care. All regressions control for Hospital, Year,
Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay Category Fixed Effects.
Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and
standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, **
represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.
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Table VIII: Effects of Simulated Eligibility on Log Charges per Day by Insurance
Type for Hospitals from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for
Working Age Men with At Least One Chronic Condition
Private
Medicaid Medicare Uninsured/Charity
Covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Simulated Eligibility
-0.993*
-0.111
-0.389
1.438
(0.500)
(0.651)
(0.452)
(1.804)
Mean(Chg. Per Day)
# of Cells
R-squared

$7,930
1,384,078
0.7413

$4,520
616,184
0.7287

$5,380
736,596
0.7007

$5,452
435,811
0.7051

Notes: Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis codes for working age men with at least
one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS. Regressions are for four insurance types: Private
Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charity Care. The payment rate is constructed
as the average charges per patient by insurance type. All regressions control for Hospital, Year,
Quarter, Diagnosis, Race, and Age Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted using the
discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state
level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level,
and *** represents a 1 percent significance level. The charge rate is constructed by dividing
total aggregate charges by total days spent in the hospital in a cell.

42

Table IX: Effects on Insurance Type and Log(Charge Rate) for Hospitals from
HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 50 and 500 Primary Diagnoses for Working Age Men
with At Least One Chronic Condition
Private
Medicaid
Medicare Uninsured/Charity
Covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Top 50 Diagnosis Codes
I: Insurance Type
Sim. Eligibility
-0.328***
0.294**
-0.004
0.038
(0.091)
(0.108)
(0.055)
(0.123)
Mean(Payer Type)
0.49
0.19
0.21
0.11
# of Cells
2,742,211
2,742,211
2,742,211
2,742,211
R-squared
0.2717
0.1979
0.1237
0.1229
II: Log(Charge Rate)
Sim. Eligibility
-1.306**
-0.112
-0.565
1.471
(0.601)
(0.727)
(0.470)
(1.913)
Mean (Pay Rate)
$28,006
$25,601
$27,436
$22,395
# of Cells
1,167,824
557,078
672,758
344,551
R-squared
0.7700
0.7842
0.7513
0.7630

Sim. Eligibility
Mean(Payer Type)
# of Cells
R-squared
Sim. Eligibility
Mean(Pay Rate)
# of Cells
R-squared

-0.308***
(0.083)
0.49
5,864,253
0.2539
-1.104**
(0.516)
$28,485
2,670,563
0.7444

Panel B: Top 500 Diagnosis Codes
I: Insurance Type
0.292**
-0.031
0.047
(0.118)
(0.039)
(0.129)
0.19
0.21
0.11
5,864,253
5,864,253
5,864,253
0.1817
0.1182
0.1335
II: Log(Charge Rate)
-0.111
-0.592
0.872
(0.677)
(0.432)
(1.665)
$26,579
$28,301
$22,140
1,113,161
1,364,157
716,372
0.7766
0.7412
0.7506

Notes: Results are for the top 50 (Panel A) and top 500 (Panel B) primary diagnosis codes for
working age men with at least one chronic condition in the HCUP NIS. The dependent
variables in the Insurance Type Analyses (I) are indicator variables for four insurance types:
Private, Medicaid, Medicare, and Self-pay/Charity. The dependent variable for Log(Charge
Rate) (II) is constructed as the log of the total aggregate charges divided by total discharges in a
cell for a given insurance type. All regressions control for Hospital, Year, Quarter, Diagnosis,
Race, Age Category, and Duration of Stay Category Fixed Effects. Regressions are weighted
using the discharge weight constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at
the state level. * represents a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance
level, and *** represents a 1 percent significance level.
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Table X: Effects on Duration of Hospital Stay by Insurance Type for Discharges
from HCUP NIS 1995-2007: Top 100 Primary Diagnoses for Working Age Men
with At Least One Chronic Condition
Private
Medicaid
Medicare Uninsured/Charity
Dep. Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Sim. Eligibility

Panel A: Average Length of Hospital Stay (Days)
0.241
0.695
-0.381
-4.991**
(1.198)
(2.315)
(1.853)
(2.309)

R-squared

0.2427

Sim. Eligibility

Panel B: Log Average Length of Hospital Stay (Days)
-0.124
0.112
-0.245
-0.442
(0.289)
(0.324)
(0.212)
(0.429)

R-squared

0.3783

0.3310

0.3135

0.2971

4.24
1,412,671

6.81
626,482

6.49
749,167

4.94
435,811

Mean(Avg. Stay)
# of Cells

0.1873

0.1774

0.1865

Notes: Author’s calculation from Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project’s (HCUP)
Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) (1995-2007). Results are for the top 100 primary diagnosis
codes for working age men with at least one chronic conditions in the HCUP NIS. Regressions
are for four insurance types: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and Uninsured/Charitycare. Duration measures include the average days (Panel A) and the log of average days (Panel
B) spent in the hospital for a cell. All regressions control for Hospital, Year, Quarter,
Diagnosis, Race, and Age fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using the discharge weight
constructed by the HCUP NIS and standard errors are clustered at the state level. * represents
a 10 percent significance level, ** represents a 5 percent significance level, and *** represents a
1 percent significance level.

44

Figure I: Aggregate Hospital Payment-to-Cost Ratio,
by Insurance Type, 1992-2012

1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1
0.9
0.8
1990

1995

Medicare

2000
Year
Medicaid

2005

2010

Private

Notes: Data sourced from the American Hospital Association’s Trendwatch Chartbook 2014,
Table 4. The figure includes a time series from 1992 to 2012 of aggregate total payments relative
to the total costs required to treat private, Medicaid, and Medicare patients for US hospitals.
Payments include Medicare and Medicaid Disproportionate Share payments.
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Figure II: Graphical Representation of the Mixed Economy Model

Notes: In a mixed economy model, hospitals face two markets: a price setting market
represented by downward sloping demands corresponding to marginal revenue curves MRP1 and
later MRP2 and a government reimbursed market represented by a horizontal line at the public
reimbursement rate Pm. When crowd-out occurs in a Medicaid expansion, MRP1 rotates to
MRP2 and the price for a hospital with marginal cost curve MC decreases from P1 to P2.
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Figure III: Relationship between HCUP Charges and Market Scan Payments,
Top 100 DRG's with 45 Degree Line
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Notes: The figure compares MarketScan CCE Average Total Payments and HCUP NIS Average
Total Charges for the years 2003 and 2004 for working age (20-64) men. MarketScan CCE
Average Total Payments are constructed as the total claims (in thousands of dollars) for a state,
year, DRG cell divided by the total number of patients in the cell. HCUP NIS Average Charges
are constructed as the total charges for private patients only in a state, year, DRG cell divided by
the total number of NIS private patients in that cell. The data points for the two samples are
then merged by state, year, and DRG classification. The solid black line is a 45 degree line.
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